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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the West German economy to find the reason for 
“Wirtschaftswunder,” the German economic miracle, and contrast the decisions made 
after WWII to those made after WWI. The approaches of foreign powers in these periods 
are also analyzed. After WWI, the subsequent hyperinflation and economic collapse is 
mainly found to be a result of poor economic decisions within German institutions, 
although the collapse was almost certainly supplemented by poor foreign policy decisions 
by the Allied Powers. Wirtschaftswunder was made possible by Ludwig Erhard’s 
reforms, which are found to have been much more important to West Germany’s success 
and successful denazification than the Marshall Plan. The best plan for economic 
recovery for Germany was one of least economic interference. In the years immediately 
following WWII, the Allied Powers were extremely influential in governmental 
institutions, but this was only to help stabilize the devastated country for a short period of 
time after the war and help rebuild its political institutions so it could return to self-
governance. West Germany’s economy was allowed to grow, unhindered by large 
reparations payments, catching up to its productivity capacity that was never truly 
eliminated by Allied bombing during the war. 
Keywords: Wirtschaftswunder, Allies, Ludwig Erhard, Marshall Plan, West Germany 
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Wirtschaftswunder: A Study into the Causes and Catalysts of the German Economic 
Miracle 
Introduction 
The West German economic miracle, known as Wirtschaftswunder, was a 
complete economic transformation that took place after World War II had finally come to 
its conclusion. After WWII, much of Europe was in shambles. Many countries were quite 
simply devastated, both in terms of economic stability and infrastructure, most notably 
Poland. Germany had committed atrocities during the war previously unmatched in terms 
of scale and vulgarity in the modern era. Despite this, during the 1950s, Germany found 
itself as one of the world’s leading economic industrial powers, with quite favorable 
quality of life, employment rates, economic stability, and median income. This could not 
be more different from its post-WWI years, when the economy experienced complete 
economic failure and one of the worst instances of hyperinflation in modern-day history.  
 In this thesis, several important questions will be addressed. The West German 
economic recovery will be analyzed from several different angles and the post-WWI 
German economic failure will be extensively studied to find the reasons for its collapse. 
The treaties will also be investigated, showing how the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences 
and the Marshall Plan aided West German recovery and also how Germany was 
essentially failed by the Treaty of Versailles. In doing so, the questions of the extent to 
which Germany’s post-WWI hardships were self-inflicted and the extent to which the 
Treaty of Versailles can be blamed will be subsequently addressed. The main mistakes 
made both internally and externally after WWI will be analyzed to show how Germany 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 5 
and the foreign powers imposing reparations on it learned from their mistakes, along with 
the pivotal actions and plans that made the West German economy so successful.  
 Research into this period of time has major modern-day applicability for 
economic recovery. It is unrealistic to believe another war of a similar scale and with a 
similar outcome cannot happen, and as a result, world economies, cities, and entire 
nations may need to be rebuilt from scratch. To understand Wirtschaftswunder is to 
understand how to successfully and safely repair a nation in order to alleviate the pain 
and suffering of its citizens and return the region to stability, something that the world 
will very likely need to do in the near future. The goal of humanity ought to be 
maintaining peace and therefore promoting economic stability and recovery, both of 
which are absolutely essential to sustained peace.  
Initial Contrast 
 The post WWII West German economic success was a stark contrast to the post 
WWI German economic failure. The total military casualty count of WWII has been best 
estimated at 34.5 million, but at the time, there was no truly effective way to measure the 
extremely high civilian casualties and PTSD had not yet been discovered and therefore 
could not be included in the casualty count. As a result, the true casualty count estimates 
vary greatly (US War Department, 1957). When WWI ended, the victorious Allied 
Powers imposed significant reparations payments and treaties on the Central Powers, who 
had already lost significant portions of their populations due to the war. The Big Four 
(The United States, Italy, France, and Great Britain) determined that Germany, as the 
chief instigator of the conflict, should pay and forfeit the most. Therefore, the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles were extremely harsh, forcing Germany to give up large portions 
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of land (roughly 13%), demilitarization of the Rhineland, significant lowering in the 
number of Germany’s military forces, a particularly demoralizing “War Guilt Clause” 
(stating that Germany would accept complete and sole responsibility for the start of 
WWII), and pay reparations for the full cost of all damages caused during the course of 
the war (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2018). In the years following 
WWI, the German economy failed in a catastrophic fashion for several reasons that will 
be addressed. 
 In the 1950s, Germany rebounded economically both in terms of magnitude and 
timeliness in ways that could never been predicted. While the 1920s were characterized 
by staggering unemployment, crippling depression, unprecedented hyperinflation, and 
starvation, the 1950s contained what can only be described as an industrial miracle. 
Germany rebuilt with blitzkrieg-like speed, establishing itself once again as a leading 
economic power in years instead of decades. This can be attributed to the completely 
different approach that both West Germany and the victorious Allied Powers took to 
recovery after WWII, which resulted in economic stability and an extended period of 
peace. 
Germany Directly After WWI 
The new German government (The Weimer Republic) that came after Kaiser 
Wilhelm III had fled to exile, which was in charge of representing Germany at the post 
WWI peace conferences, was at a crossroads on whether to fully and publically accept 
the War Guilt Clause or not. They “feared that Germany’s alleged responsibility for the 
war would cause the Allies to broaden the relatively restrictive meaning of the term 
‘reparations’… and serve as the basis for unlimited reparation claims” (Boemeke, 
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Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). While the War Guilt Clause would be imposed on them 
regardless, choosing to not accept full responsibility for WWI could possibly soften 
negotiations, making it more possible for the Fourteen Points to be imposed instead of 
harsher treaties (even though, as seen, this would not be the case). This was an extremely 
problematic stance for both the peace negotiation process and Germany as a whole. “In 
refusing to acknowledge Germany’s “war guilt,” the new German government implicitly 
exonerated the old monarchical order” (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). This 
invalidated Germany’s early claim of a new democratic nation that had separated itself 
from the old regime, leaving Germany without a true and established identity. It had not 
fully dissociated itself from Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany due to worries that it would 
invalidate the current new Weimer Republic government’s claim to rule and, in giving a 
confession of guilt, provide more ammunition for the Allied powers to make the 
reparations payments even more severe (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). In 
refusing to willfully accept responsibility for the war and maintaining its innocence 
throughout the peace process, it was impossible for the German people to ever fully 
accept the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany were frozen; a people 
economically decimated by what it saw as unjust and unfair reparations payments without 
a clear dream or ideal (the new, democratic state) to move toward. Instead of receiving 
closure with the acceptance of wrongdoing, the German people were overwhelmed with a 
sense of anger and injustice.  
The Treaty of Versailles was shown to be flawed in both a moral and legal sense, 
and famed British economist John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of 
Peace further highlighted its abundance of flaws, most notably how impossible it would 
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be for the German economy to recover under the conditions imposed on it by the Treaty. 
An open critique of the Treaty opened the door for possible revisions at a later date, but 
also gave the German people even more reason to feel, without a shadow of a doubt, that 
there was injustice. Keynes was a staunch critic of the peace conference from the start. 
He stated that Wilson’s Fourteen Points, while maybe well intentioned, completely 
ignored the harsh economic realities of post-war recovery. He also stated that Versailles’ 
harsh burdens and land cessions imposed on Germany “threatened Europe’s entire 
financial equilibrium. Such economic strangulation also threatened to prolong needlessly 
European recovery from war” (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 191). Keynes’ 
concerns were not solely about German recovery, but about Europe as a whole. 
Eliminating the purchasing and industrial capabilities of one of Europe’s strongest 
powers would have consequences for the entire continent, which also needed to rebuilt. 
Instead of providing more capital for nations to rebuild, which was its so-called intention, 
sizeable reparations payments without a manageable payment plan actually starved 
Europe of purchasing power and production that it needed more at that time than ever 
before. The reparations payments arrived in three sets in the year 1921. The first set, the 
A bonds, amounted to 12 billion marks, which compiled 20% of Germany’s 1913 (which 
was, by all accounts, an extremely productive year for the German economy). The second 
set, the B bonds, accounted for 38 billion marks, or 100% of the GDP for that year. The 
final set, the C bonds, were valued at 82 billion marks (260% of 1913 GDP), although the 
C bonds were, in all actuality, recognized by both sides as never actually going to be paid 
(Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 113).  
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A bond between Germany and the United States was formed quite early in the 
peace process following WWI. While the European contingent of the Big Four desired to 
impose the heaviest possible reparations payments on Germany, US President Woodrow 
Wilson initially desired a much more manageable plan for Germany that would allow for 
foreseeable economic recovery. Wilson’s main desire for after WWI was a sustainable 
peace throughout Europe, led by a soon-to-be-formed League of Nations. This plan was 
outlined in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which was later thrown out at the peace process in 
favor of harsher treaty terms for Germany. While the Fourteen Points were deemed too 
ideological by many economists, including Keyes, Germany still recognized the effort by 
the United States to attempt to aid Germany in its rebuilding. This later paved the way for 
a strong trade and loan partnership in the 1920s between Germany and the United States 
in an attempt to assist in the recovery of the German economy and help it pay back its 
reparations debts to Europe (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 47). 
Hyperinflation and Economic Failure within Germany 
The German economic crash of 1923 had its beginnings in WWI. In 1914, at the 
outbreak of the war, Germany departed from the gold standard, which is not uncommon 
for countries at war (Graham, 1930, p. 19). In order to finance the war, instead of taxing 
its people higher, it borrowed large amounts with the help of the Reichsbank in the form 
of bonds. The treasury than began printing money at higher rates to pay back these dues; 
money that was no longer backed by the gold standard. As a result, “A growing 
percentage of government debt… found its way into the vaults of the central bank and an 
equivalent amount of printing press money into people's cash holdings. In short, the 
central bank was monetizing the growing government debt” (Sennholz, 2006). Due to 
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wartime expenditures and necessary production, both prices and money in circulation 
rose steadily in Germany from 1914-1918, which is not unusual for a country during 
wartime. By the time that the armistice was signed, the amount of money in circulation in 
Germany had risen fourfold and prices increased by roughly 140% (Sennholz, 2006). 
While this certainly does not mean that high levels of inflation would be certain or even 
probable in the years following WWI (economic actions could have easily been taken to 
offset this), this should have been a worrying sign for the Federal Ministry of Finance in 
Germany. However, this was simply dismissed and largely ignored by many in the 
German government, as were the other signs of inflation in Germany. After the war, the 
German government continued to print money in order to pay expenses, workers, and 
make reparations payments. Germany desperately needed gold and strong foreign 
currency, which it did not have. In December of 1923, only five years after the war had 
ended, the German bank had issued an incredible total of 496.5 quintillion marks, which 
had diluted the German mark to 1-trillionth of its value in 1914, resulting in one of the 
greatest recorded instances of hyperinflation in history (Sennholz, 2006). During 
November of 1923, 42 billion marks were worth roughly one American cent (Graham, 
1930, p. 4). 
During the years preceding 1923, many in the German government did not 
recognize the growing danger of inflation. In the early 20s, the German Finance Minister 
Karl Helfferich concluded that there was in fact no inflation in Germany “since the total 
value in circulation, when measured in gold, was covered by the gold reserves in the 
Reichsbank at a much higher ratio than before the war” (Sennholz, 2006). This was 
further cemented by the president of the Reichsbank at the time, Rudolf Havenstein. In a 
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pre-crash study done by the Statistical Bureau of the German Government, it was found 
that “there was a shortage of currency in Germany, but a great deal of inflation abroad,” 
stating that Germany’s financial state was under control (Sennholz, 2006). The 
government argued that although there was a growing amount of money issued, the real 
value of the currency in circulation was relatively low. This logic and reasoning gave the 
Germans authorization to continue printing more money to cover its expenses and pay 
back its debts. Directly after the war, they devoted exorbitant amounts of money for 
health, education, and other public expenses (money that Germany did not have) in an 
effort to repair the infrastructure of its country and provide jobs for its many returning 
soldiers. Government expenses skyrocketed, and taxes alone could never cover the 
expenses, as many of its citizens were already either financially struggling or 
impoverished as a result of the devastation that resulted from WWI. Initially, when the 
Weimer Republic was established in 1919 and a new Constitution was written up in 
1920, there was a tax plan put into place that seemed to be quite strong; a firm tax bracket 
was successfully implemented along with a stronger and more centralized tax collection 
system. Inflation was actually stopped for a short period of time. However, when news of 
the actual extent of the reparations broke out, which was much larger than the German 
people had initially predicted, a “veritable tax boycott developed. Tax collection 
plummeted, the monetization of short-term government paper resumed, and inflation 
accelerated again” (Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 113). Inflation was happening faster than 
the rate of taxing; in fact, in the time between when the taxable transaction occurred and 
the date of the actual tax payment, the value of the tax was useless. Therefore, the 
government printed even more money at an even faster rate to combat the lack of tax 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 12 
revenue. From 1914 to 1923, only a meager 15% of the government’s expenses were 
covered by taxes. In October of 1923, this number had dropped to a staggering 0.8% 
(Sennholz, 2006). The German government had found itself in a cycle that it was unable 
to escape.  
Foreign Occupation of the Ruhr 
Another contributing factor to economic devastation was the French and Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr that began in latter part of 1922 and early 1923 (Crafts & Fearon, 
2013, p. 113). This was an action unsupported by many of the Allied creditors, including 
the United States and Britain (Sennholz, 2006). The Ruhr was a resource rich land in 
western Germany with extremely high production and manufacturing potential, with 
many of Germany’s factories and other parts of their supply chains, including several rich 
coal mines, located there. In the mind of the French and Belgian governments, taking full 
control of the Ruhr and its abundance of resources would help contribute to the unpaid 
reparations and help their respective economies recover (The Wiener Library for the 
Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, 2018). This proved to be a completely 
counterproductive strategy. Instead of bringing a steady supply of capital into the French 
and Belgian economies, this furthered hindered Germany from being able to pay off its 
substantial reparations debts and therefore starved the Allies of much-needed reparations. 
German workers refused to work under the foreign French and Belgian occupation, 
choosing to develop and maintain a policy of passive resistance. This was encouraged by 
the German government, who continued to pay the workers, even though there was zero 
productive output from that region. Financing the German workers in their program of 
passive resistance was a costly process funded mostly with discounted treasury bills 
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(Graham, 1930, p. 10). This led to a substantial decrease in German productivity and 
GDP and contributed even more to the ever-growing increase in governmental 
expenditures in addition to inflation. 
Refusal to Accept Responsibility 
A large portion of the government and scholarly contingent of Germany refused 
to accept responsibility for the hyperinflation and economic failure; it continued to assert 
that the hyperinflation that was occurring was a result of the reparations that the Treaty 
imposed, not because of the poor economic and fiscal decisions made by the government. 
The government continued contributing the current position it was in to the Allies instead 
of accepting internal responsibility, which contributed to the ease to which Adolf Hitler 
rose to power a decade later. They acted as if the position they were in was inevitable, 
continuing to hold to the idea that the government made the correct decisions. However, 
according to Hans Sennholz, a former Professor of Economics at Grove City College and 
President of the Foundation for Economic Education, Germany’s economic errors can be 
almost exclusively attributed to poor internal fiscal and policy decisions made within the 
German government. Sennholz states that although Germany blamed the Treaty of 
Versailles for its economic problems, the reparations payments in and of themselves did 
not necessitate crippling hyperinflation. The value of money and excessive reparations 
payments are completely independent of each other. There will be a favorable balance of 
payments that will objectively occur when there is a reduction of currency in the central 
bank (due to the purchase of gold or other foreign exchange from the central bank to the 
treasury for the government), as long as the country is still moderately productive. This 
favorable balance of payments drops the price of goods, incentivizing other countries to 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 14 
purchase goods from that country, therefore introducing relatively strong foreign 
currency to the economy, while simultaneously discouraging imports (because of the low 
price of goods). “In short, there can be no shortage of gold or foreign exchange as long as 
the central bank refrains from inflation and monetary depreciation” (Sennholz, 2006). 
While this may arguably be an oversimplified model that does not take into account the 
full magnitude of the economic stress Germany was under at the time, the basic principle 
still holds true.  
Havenstein also pointed to speculators at home and abroad as the reason the 
German financial market failed, calling it an “attack” by other countries, and many other 
established figures in the German economic community echoed this. This theory was 
introduced to the public through newspapers and other forms of media and was widely 
spread throughout the German public (Sennholz, 2006). Interestingly enough, speculators 
in Germany that were villainized by German hierarchy were actually preserving their 
capital and the capital of the society as a whole; the German government was the one 
wiping it out. There was also a “flight of capital” from Germany, which occurred when 
German citizens and those elsewhere invested abroad instead of Germany, recognizing 
correctly that the excessive printing of money was unsustainable and would result in 
economic failure. While Havenstein blamed foreign entities for Germany’s economic 
devastation, foreign governments had lost significant amounts as a result of the 
hyperinflation as well. “According to various authoritative estimates, foreign individuals 
and banks bought at least sixty billion paper marks which the Reichsbank had floated 
abroad at an average price of one-fourth gold mark for a paper mark. The depreciation of 
the mark to one-trillionth of its earlier value repudiated these foreign claims to German 
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goods. Thus foreigners suffered losses of some fifteen billion gold marks, or some $3.5 
billion US dollars, which was eight times more than Germany had paid in foreign 
exchange on account of reparations” (Sennholz, 2006). 
External Reasons for Hyperinflation 
While almost every notable scholar agrees that the fiscal decisions made during 
the early 1920s were the main contributors to the German economy’s collapse, others 
point to excessive reparations and specific decisions made by the Allied powers as key 
contributing factors to the economic demise of the German economy. As previously 
stated, Keynes was one of the staunchest critics of the Treaty from the start, critiquing it 
for both its moral and economic qualities. Keynes correctly stated that the rest of 
Europe’s recovery would be directly linked to Germany’s recovery, and if the German 
economy failed due to excessive limitations and reparations placed on them by the 
Treaty, they would be unable to pay off their sizeable debts. This would severely limit the 
purchasing power and production capabilities of Germany and Europe as a whole. It is 
also important to make note of Germany’s financial position before the reparations 
payments were imposed. When the strong new tax plan was instituted by the Weimer 
Republic in 1920, inflation was halted for a time and the economy looked as if it would 
recover quickly and steadily (Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 146). However, when the high 
reparation amounts were announced, inflation skyrocketed once again. More feasible 
reparations payments and a manageable and clear reparations payment plan could have 
assisted Germany in stopping its steadily rising inflation. The French and Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr also should be noted as stunting the German economy. In taking 
over the factories and mines in the area, the occupation severely limited German 
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productivity and output, making it even more difficult for Germany to pay back its 
reparations, forcing it to print more money.  
Economic Recovery and Post-Hyperinflation 
To combat German hyperinflation and ensure that the German economy could 
recover in order to pay back its reparations, the Reparation Commission met in 1923 to 
reevaluate Germany’s reparation payments. Led by Charles G. Dawes and other 
representatives of the Allied Powers, the Dawes Plan was introduced in 1924. The Dawes 
Plan aligned Germany’s reparation payments with the state of its economy; initially, the 
reparations payments would be very low to reflect Germany’s economic state (which at 
this time was extremely poor). As Germany’s economy began to regain strength, its 
reparations payments would rise in proportion to its economic prosperity. It was stated 
that foreign officials would supervise economic policy and decision making. France and 
Belgium were asked to evacuate the Ruhr in order to stimulate manufacturing and 
production in German industry. The biggest part of the Dawes Plan, however, was the 
$200 million loan from the Allies to help bolster the German economy. This plan proved 
to be incredibly helpful for Germany, so much so that Charles Dawes received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1925 (Office of the Historian, 2018). 
Over the course of the war, the US lent over $10 billion to the European Allied 
powers; debts that it fully planned on recovering. The US continued to loan Germany 
money from 1924-1929 to help it pay back its reparation debts to the Allied powers. 
From the US perspective, as Germany paid back its debts to Europe, the European Allies 
would then be able to pay back the United States. As a result, the US invested millions 
into the German economy in hopes that as Germany became more stable, the US would 
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begin to recover the $10 billion it lent to Europe during the war. Due to the stabilization 
and adjustment that occurred as a result of the US loans, the German economy was able 
to experience recovery led by large short-term loans. The Dawes Plan actually 
encouraged Germany to continue borrowing large amounts of strong foreign currency 
(Office of the Historian, 2018). With the aid and recommendations of the US, Germany 
began paying its reparations on credit from foreign loans, including the initially $200 
million loan and subsequent US loans throughout the 20s. This later would be dubbed 
“the transfer problem” and would prove to be harmful for both Germany and the US.  
This plan was extremely successful for German recovery until the Great 
Depression hit in 1929. While the German industrial production and the German 
economy as a whole were doing much better as a result of the Dawes Plan, there was a 
fatal flaw in the plan that was shown in 1929. In accepting the American loans, Germany 
was effectively staking its economy’s future on the strength of the American economy 
and the influx of strong foreign currency that it was receiving as a result of the Dawes 
Plan (Office of the Historian, 2018). During the 20s, the American economy was 
extremely successful, with high levels of economic prosperity and relatively low 
unemployment. The housing and stock markets were both very strong as well, and the 
loans seemed to be a relatively safe and stable source of cash flows. Germany steadily 
developed an incredibly high current account deficit. However, when the US stock 
market failed, it began to recall the loans and stopped loaning money to Germany. 
Without the loans, which had been propping up the German economy for years, German 
businesses failed. German unemployment once again hit extremely high numbers. 
According to the Wiener Library for the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, the 
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world’s oldest archive on the Nazi era, unemployment reached six million in 1932, 
although this number was much closer to nine million due to the fact that millions of 
citizens were also unemployed but were unable to register for the work force (The 
Wiener Library for the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, 2018). 
 Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party took advantage of 
the difficult position Germany was in during the Great Depression. Unemployment was 
at levels never before seen in Germany during the modern era. Businesses were failing on 
a large scale and starvation and homelessness were serious problems for the German 
government. Crime was also an issue, as people resorted to drastic measures in order to 
survive. Due to the lack of accountability and responsibility in the Germany after WWI, 
these issues were considered by the greater German population to be direct and 
unavoidable consequences of unfair and horrific reparations imposed on them by the 
Allied forces. As a result, there was a deep-seeded anger and frustration in the country, 
coupled with intense desperation. Hitler recognized this anger and channeled it towards 
actual productive goals. He gave the German people an outlet in the form of a group of 
people to use as a real, tangible target for their frustrations. He showed a public disdain 
for the Treaty of Versailles, which he characterized as unjust, unfair, and corrupt, further 
cementing the idea that Germany was not to blame for the position they were currently in. 
He promised that, with the help of the German people, he would rebuild the economy and 
the German military. He once again gave people a sense of nationalism and a belief in a 
strong, proud, new German state. He promised jobs for the unemployed, food and 
clothing for the starving, and revenge on the people that had put Germany in this 
position. He later went on to start another World War, engage in widespread genocide 
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and ethnic cleansing processes that almost eradicated an entire people group, and cause 
the deaths of millions of innocent men, women, and children.  
Post WWI Summary and Conclusion 
 To summarize, there were serious errors made by both the Allied powers in the 
years during and following the Treaty of Versailles and the German finance department 
that led to hyperinflation and unemployment in Germany. On the Allied side, the Treaty 
of Versailles contained reparations that Germany could never have paid back, creating 
large amounts of debt. The payments severely restricted the possibility of economic 
success as the German economy suffered from unnecessary Allied interference. This debt 
was not accompanied by an effective payment plan and proper assistance from the Allied 
powers. With a realistic payment plan that mirrored German economic health, inflation 
may have been kept under control. After all, despite the fact that it was objectively to 
blame for the majority of the outbreak of WWI, Germany was itself a nation devastated 
by war attempting to recover. Assistance in the payment of its debts to help Germany 
recover and stimulate its economy would have actually allowed for the payment of more 
reparations and would help those other countries that desperately needed the reparations 
payments and Germany’s industry and purchasing power in order to recover. This was 
displayed by the Dawes Plan which, although it was hindered by the outbreak of the 
Great Depression, greatly assisted the German economy and Europe as a whole from the 
years 1924-1929 (Office of the Historian, 2018). Had the plan been instituted directly 
after the war, it is entirely possible that many of the poor decisions made by the Germans 
could have been avoided. The occupation of the Ruhr also further hindered German 
economic recovery and industry and was objectively a poor decision by the Allied 
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powers. There was also a failure to recognize, as Keynes stated, that Europe’s recovery 
was directly related to the economy of Germany. As stated earlier, Europe desperately 
needed Germany’s purchasing power and strong industrial potential in order to fully 
recover. In placing restrictions on German economy growth, all of Europe was therefore 
restricted as well. The German economy failed, making it much more difficult for the 
continent as a whole to recover. 
However, although Germany was certainly not assisted by the decisions made by 
the Allies immediately after the war, the actual hyperinflation that caused the economy to 
crumble was more of a byproduct of the decisions made within the German government. 
The decisions made in the Treaty of Versailles did not necessitate hyperinflation, and 
therefore the responsibility for the German hyperinflation and economic crash lies almost 
solely with the German government (Sennholz, 2006). During the war, under the 
assumption they would win, the German government borrowed large amounts instead of 
raising taxes to higher rates, relying almost solely on debt to finance wartime 
expenditures. The amount of money in circulation also rose along with the government 
debt. Moving from the gold standard during the war meant that the German mark was no 
longer backed by gold, opening the mark up to the possibility of inflation. Germany was 
unable to return to it after the war due to their initial reparations payments, so although 
their currency was in danger of inflating, they continued printing money at an exorbitant 
rate rather than attempt to limit the amount of currency in circulation. The government 
financed large public health and infrastructure expenditures in order to create jobs 
without an effective tax system to finance these expenditures. Helfferich, Havenstein, and 
others that continued to incorrectly assert that there was no hyperinflation in Germany. 
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They paid workers in the Ruhr to strike with money they did not have when it was under 
foreign occupation (Sennholz, 2006). Another crippling error occurred after the war 
under the Dawes Plan, in which Germany initially recovered by staking their economic 
success on the success of the American economy. Instead of moving to be self-sufficient 
in the years before the Great Depression, they relied on the loans from the US to prop up 
the economy. When the stock market crashed and the US recalled the loans instead of 
supplying them, the German economy failed once again, experiencing extremely high 
levels of unemployment. Frank D. Graham, Professor of Economics at Princeton from 
1921-1945, states the following about the German post-WWI financial turmoil: 
While the payments of cash reparations in 1921 undoubtedly played an 
important part in promoting the decline in the currency, and while the 
sanctions imposed on Germany in 1923 led to the ultimate collapse, this is, 
of course, by no means the whole story. It is true that, if a more soundly 
conceived and executed reparations policy had been adopted by the 
creditor Powers, inflation of the currency might perhaps have been stayed 
by the vigorous measures of reform of the public finances initiated in 
Germany in 1920. But inflation had none the less proceeded far before any 
cash reparations whatever had been paid and it was accelerated after they 
had been entirely suspended… it was, in many German quarters, nurtured 
rather than repressed (Graham, 1930, p. 10). 
The Treaty of Versailles contained reparations payments that would have made 
economic success very difficult, but the Treaty’s provisions did not necessitate economic 
failure. The economic failure was caused by a lack of understanding about inflation, a 
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poor and unenforced tax plan, large amounts of debt, and a lack of strong economic 
reforms to stimulate production and industry. In continuing to monetize the growing 
government debt, Germany’s currency became more and more unstable. Without a strong 
currency to work for, Germany’s workforce and businesses became unmotivated, both to 
work for and sell for weak currency. Germany’s productivity and production levels 
dropped greatly and businesses could not remain stimulated. Germany’s internal 
monetary policy was horrific, and in continuing to print money without backing it, its 
currency became worthless, making it impossible to pay off its debts both to its people 
and to foreign powers. In recovering from WWII, Germany would have to make 
significant changes to its monetary policy in order to make sure that the mistakes it made 
were not repeated. 
World War II Introduction 
 After World War II, Germany was in a similar position as it was post-WWI. They 
had been defeated in another global world war that had left an extremely high death count 
on both sides. Its infrastructure and several notable cities, most notably Dresden and 
Berlin, had suffered significant damage. Over 20% of all housing in Germany had been 
destroyed. Food production per capita in 1947 was just 51% of its 1938 levels. Industrial 
output in 1947 was merely a third of its 1938 levels and a large percentage of Germany’s 
working-age men were killed or permanently wounded and unable to work (Henderson, 
2018). The hyperinflation and economic collapse were still fresh in the minds of the 
German citizens after WWII, as many of them were alive to experience the full extent of 
the crash at that time. The problem did not just boil down to poor economic decisions, 
although those were certainly prevalent. There was also a cultivated and complete lack of 
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accountability and responsibility within the German government, an incorrect perception 
of inflation and how it worked, an ineffective tax system, irresponsible government 
spending (with money it did not have), an overreliance on foreign countries and foreign 
currency, and an extreme amount of debt. There were also problems with the Allies, as 
they recognized that eliminating the purchasing power and reducing the economic 
stability of one of Europe’s most powerful nations affected all of Europe as a whole. 
Destabilizing a nation also opened the door for volatility and political instability. 
Changes needed to be made across the board in order to make sure that the mistakes 
made post-WWI were not repeated.  
WWII Conferences and Plans for Germany 
Yalta 
The Yalta Conference took place in February of 1945, when Allied Victory 
against Germany was all but guaranteed. Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin 
D. Roosevelt met in the USSR to discuss how they would effectively go about ending the 
war with minimal casualties and what post-war actions they would take to punish 
Germany and rebuild Europe, but their main focus was the unconditional surrender of 
Germany. It was agreed that upon its surrender, Germany would be split into 4 
occupational zones controlled by the US, Britain, France, and the USSR (UNC Center for 
European Studies, 2018). Yalta was the precursor to the longer and larger conference, 
Potsdam, that took place after Germany had officially surrendered, and many of the plans 
for Germany that were implemented after the Potsdam Conference had their beginnings 
at Yalta, including denazification, reparations payments, and the staffing of the German 
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government, along with plans for rebuilding the devastated Polish state and Europe’s 
infrastructure.  
Potsdam 
The Potsdam Conference officially took place from July 17th to August 2nd, 1945, 
after Germany had officially surrendered on May 7 (UNC Center for European Studies, 
2018). While the overarching goal was achieving a period of sustained peace, the main 
focus of Potsdam was defining and implementing a long-term plan for Germany to 
promote economic stability, repay war reparations, and to make sure they would not 
instigate another World War in the future. The plan was fourfold, involving the 
decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany. It was 
decided that the land aggressively taken under Hitler’s rule would be returned to its pre-
war ownership, and a portion of Germany’s land on its eastern border would be forfeited, 
resulting in the harsh relocation and exile of hundreds of thousands of Germans living in 
what would later become Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. There would also be a 
complete transformation of the West German economy that would starkly contrast the 
Treaty of Versailles and sanctions placed on Germany after WWI.  In the years preceding 
WWII, Germany’s economic success and stability could be accounted to wartime 
industry and heavy levels of production. Rather than eliminating much of their industrial 
and economic capabilities, as after WWI, it sought to transform it and maintain some sort 
of economic strength. Germany would move to a nation characterized by more efficient 
agriculture and light domestic industry (UNC Center for European Studies, 2018). West 
Germany was later established in May 1949. East Germany followed in October of 1949 
West Germany, made up of the English, French, and American occupied zones, 
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developed a strong capitalist democracy with a market economy. East Germany became 
communist under direct and centralized Soviet influence.  
The Potsdam Conference necessitated a complete shift in German education, 
industry, economic policy, and the mindset of the German people. As a result of the 
unconditional surrender, as stated in the official Potsdam Conference report released to 
Germany, the German people would be fully and wholeheartedly convinced that their 
current hardships were a direct result of their own actions and the actions of the Nazi 
Regime (Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government (USSR, UK, and USA), 
2008, p. 2). Germany would not be able to escape responsibility as it had attempted to do 
after WWI. German administrative and economic controls were implemented by the 
Allied powers, but only to the extent necessary to develop a balanced economy and make 
sure that Germany could not develop war potential. Most of the control, however, would 
later be given to the German people in order to further cement that they were responsible 
for their own economic success and prosperity or failure after World War II. There were 
strict restrictions placed on Germany’s wartime industries: 
In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of 
arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of 
aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. 
Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that 
are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled 
and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs. 
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(Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government (USSR, 
UK, and USA), 2008, p. 11). 
However, other parts of the industry would be stimulated (those that were not 
necessary to war and militarization) to help make up for the reduction in wartime 
industries, and Allied control would only be taken as necessary to disarm, demilitarize, 
and collect reparations.  Concrete goals were set to maximize agricultural output in the 
several years following the cessation of WWII in order to make sure there was enough 
food for the German people and the occupying forces (Berlin Conference of the Three 
Heads of Government (USSR, UK, and USA), 2008, p. 7). Transportation infrastructure 
would be repaired so citizens could work, coal production would be stimulated to offset 
the subsequent energy crisis (inevitable after WWII), and housing and utilities would be 
repaired as soon as possible. Allied economic and planning assistance would be granted 
to make sure that Germany maintained an adequate average living standard for its 
citizens that would match the average living standard of the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  
There was also a plan set in place regarding Germany’s reparations payments 
from WWII in addition to the existing WWI payments. The long term reparations would 
still be substantial, but there was a different approach taken than in the years following 
World War I; reparations would be collected, but only enough as to not hinder Germany 
from being able to function without the constant assistance of external powers. The 
reparations payment plans were stretched out and much more flexible than after WWI, 
and payments were designed to mirror the German economic conditions and strength at 
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that time. Limits were set to assure that Germany would not be allowed to spend more 
than 5% of its export revenues to pay back its debt in order to assure that its economy 
would have the cash necessary to recover (Toussaint, 2006). Germany would be taught to 
be independent and self-sufficient as reasonably and practically possible. As Germany 
would still require imports in order to survive and stimulate the economy, the amount 
needed to cover the payments for these necessary imports would be provided in an 
assortment of forms by the Allied Powers (mainly the United Kingdom and the United 
States) if not able to be paid by Germany. However, the long-term goal was to reduce the 
reliance on imports and stimulate internal production of goods, services, and materials 
not essential for militarization across the 4 occupation zones. The German government 
and administrative agencies, on both a local and national scale, would be stabilized and 
engineered for success for a future democratic and peaceful nation, one day in the future 
disassociated with the countries that at that time had ultimate control over the occupation 
zones (Toussaint, 2006). They sought decentralization of governmental power across all 
local governmental agencies, and as a result there would be a delay in establishing a 
Central and ruling German government in order to build up the lower levels of the 
German government (except for those governmental programs that were absolutely 
essential for aiding German recovery at the time). Perhaps the most important task, 
though, was destroying the Nazi institutions that had taken control of the German people 
in the 30s and 40s and changing the mindset of the German population. Long-term 
sustained assurances were taken to make sure that the Nazi regime and mindset were 
unable to be revived in the future, which involved changing school criteria, changing the 
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intense feelings of racial superiority towards minorities, and erasing Nazi ideologies from 
the minds of the German people. 
Marshall Plan 
The German economy was also assisted greatly by the Marshall Plan, which is 
commonly acknowledged as one of America's greatest achievements of the twentieth 
century (Brainard, 2007). Implemented in 1948, its goal was to assist in rebuilding 
Europe in the form of aid given over the course of four years as well as stopping the 
spread of Communism to the European countries that had been substantially weakened by 
the war (Office of the Historian, 2017). As shown so clearly in the years following WWI, 
Secretary of State George Marshall and President Truman both recognized that any 
recovery of Western Europe was impossible without the recovery of West Germany. As 
stated by historian Manfred Knapp, “America’s decision to include West Germany in the 
Marshall Plan was due primarily to its desire to allow Germany to make its indispensable 
contribution to the success of the reconstruction and the stabilization of the system of 
Western European industrial states” (Knapp, Stolper, & Hudson, 1981, p. 418). The 
Marshall Plan resulted in over $12 billion in aid distributed to Western Europe, with 
Germany being one of the largest recipients, taking roughly 11% of the $12 billion 
(Office of the Historian, 2017). This resulted in substantial foreign investment in the 
West German economy and allowed for the further stimulation of domestic industry and 
the repairing of their broken infrastructure (highways, hospitals, power lines, etc.). Other 
countries profited as well; between the years of 1948 and 1951, those that accepted aid 
experienced an estimated rise in GNP by at least 15-25%. The Marshall Plan contributed 
to the successful reuniting of Western Europe by fostering trade and creating economic 
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interdependencies amongst its member nations. Secretary of State George Marshall, the 
engineer of the Marshall Plan, later received the Nobel Prize for peace and remains the 
only general in history to do so (Office of the Historian, 2017). The Marshall Plan is 
viewed as a turning point for American engagement abroad and its success has 
permanently altered American foreign policy. 
West German Growth and Years Following WWII 
West Germany experienced extreme economic growth in the 1950s that surpassed 
the economic growth of every other European nation in that time period. Between 1950 
and 1959, GDP rose by roughly 8% annually. In Europe, only Austria came even 
remotely close to matching this growth. Living standards in West Germany doubled in 
that decade, and by the early 1960s, under 20 years after the war had ceased, West 
Germany was the largest financial and economic power in Europe (Ritschl & 
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 192). By 1958, industrial production was over four times the 
annual rate at the beginning of 1948 and industrial production per capita was over 200% 
higher (Henderson, 2018). This was even more incredible when compared with 
Germany’s post WWI struggles and economic collapse. Germany was suffering from 
problems after WWII similar to its state after WWI, most notably a drop in productivity 
and destruction of its infrastructure. However, its economic growth and efficiency could 
not have been more different. 
Many scholars argue that the notable decline of output, productivity, and 
efficiency in the German economy at the end of the war and during the years immediately 
following was what allowed for such a rapid increase in growth simply because of post-
war shock: Germany began to regain access to its full capacity and increase its 
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productivity after the fighting had ceased, which historians Eichengreen and Ritschl 
argue was vastly more important than the structural changes Germany made in the years 
following WWII and the assistance in recovery lent by the Potsdam Conference and 
Marshall Plan (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193). Germany experienced significant 
negative output shock during the end of the war and in the years immediately following 
it. Between the years 1944 and 1946, output in what would soon become West Germany 
fell annually by 38%, despite a 20% rise in West German population, making an even 
more severe annualized 47% decline of per capita output a truer reflection (Ritschl & 
Eichengreen, 2009, pp. 198-199). There was a decline in German total factor productivity 
(TFP) of 69% between 1944 and 1946, as opposed to a cumulative decline in British TFP 
of 12% (which was still considered substantial) (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 199). In 
1948, the 3 Allied zones of occupation that would later become West Germany had a 
GDP of merely 64% of its 1938 level. When contrasted with the UK, where output was 
13% higher than its 1938 during 1948, this becomes even more drastic. Quite simply, the 
larger the drop in output that a country experienced during and after WWII, the faster it 
grew in the years following as it regained its composure and repaired its infrastructure 
and its workforce productivity. The reasoning for this can oddly enough be illustrated by 
an analysis of Allied bombing techniques.  
Beginning in mid-1944, Allied bombing changed its tactics to 
maximize damage to bottleneck sectors of the German economy 
(see Birkenfeld 1964; Budraß 1998). Bombing now targeted 
electric power, synthetic fuels generation, and the railroad 
network. Rather than destroying productive capacity, it simply 
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disrupted the supply chain—most prominently supplies of coal, 
which were now much harder to get from the pithead to the power 
station and factory (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 199). 
German productive capacity was never truly eliminated by bombing; although key 
areas of the country had been destroyed and others areas taken from them after the war, 
there were still intact factories, fertile farmland, and industrialized cities, especially in 
West Germany. There were many other wartime efforts by the Allied forces to target 
German bottleneck sectors, showing that Germany was merely temporarily pushed off 
their growth path that they continued on after the war had ended. West German industrial 
capacity was still extremely high, estimated during 1944 to have been at over 35% higher 
than during 1936 (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 196). It was just unable to be accessed 
due to shortages of raw materials and energy (notably coal, which in West Germany in 
1947 was at 52% of its 1938 levels). This continued into the later months of 1947. 
Having lower amounts for each reparations payment and an extended payment plan 
allowed for more money to be invested in the quick repair of German infrastructure and 
the bottleneck sectors that the Allies had destroyed, which when coupled by a rise in 
employment and worker productivity, allowed Germany to regain the output and 
productivity that it had momentarily lost during the end of the war and in the year 
immediately following its surrender. However, this is not to minimalize the German 
economic miracle, especially when compared to the German economy after WWI.  
Despite their research, a quite legitimate and popular reason in scholarly circles 
for the ability of the economy to rebound so quickly boils down to monetary reforms and 
changes in socioeconomic institutions after WWII, supportered strongly by Mancur 
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Olson’s model of the capture of policy by distributional coalitions (Ritschl & 
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193). The German economy encouraged corporatist organizations 
and industry with the help of US officials as it attempted to move from a society largely 
dependent on peasant agriculture to non-wartime industry and more efficient and more 
modern large-scale agriculture. It also instituted pro-market reforms, which allowed for 
more free trade and businesses to flourish in a competitive environment rich in human 
capital and resources. This brought it economically closer to the rest of Europe, fostering 
trade across the globe. 
The most important of these economic programs and reforms were implemented 
by economist Ludwig Erhard. Robert A. Peterson and David R. Henderson are two of the 
many scholars that attribute Ludwig Erhard’s free market reforms with beginning 
Wirtschaftswunder and freeing the potential of the German economy. A graduate of the 
University of Frankfurt, Erhard was a strong advocate for free market economies, 
rejecting Nazism and bureaucratic state planning of the economy. He would later be 
appointed as Minister of Economic Affairs and Chancellor of West Germany as a result 
of the success of his economic programs. As director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and advisor to General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the US zone of 
occupation, Erhard proposed total currency reform during 1947 that was later instituted 
on June 20, 1948 with the help of Allied control. “The basic idea (of the currency reform) 
was to substitute a much smaller number of deutschemarks (DM), the new legal currency, 
for reichsmarks. The money supply would thus contract substantially so that even at the 
controlled prices, now stated in deutschemarks, there would be fewer shortages” 
(Henderson, 2018). This resulted in an over 90% contraction in the money supply in an 
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effort to control inflation. The importance of this currency reform cannot be overstated; 
in implementing currency reform, Erhard ensured the stability of deutschemarks and 
safeguarded the economy against the hyperinflation that had so recently devastated it. 
Erhard also eliminated all price controls and rationing regulations in an effort to de-
Nazify the economy and further embrace free-market principles, which initially went 
against the Allied Control Authority’s initial economic plan. This contributed to 
incentivizing the depressed German workforce and businesses (Peterson). The currency 
reform and elimination of price controls went hand-in-hand; “Decontrol of prices allowed 
buyers to transmit their demands to sellers, without a rationing system getting in the way, 
and the higher prices gave sellers an incentive to supply more” (Henderson, 2018). This 
allowed for the self-correction of inflated prices and for the market to begin to stabilize 
itself. In the simplest of terms, the currency reform attacked inflation and the elimination 
of price controls ended repression. Erhard also supported the cutting of extremely high 
wartime tax rates, further stimulating businesses and corporations by putting more money 
in the pockets of the German people.  
There was a notable shift in the German economy after Erhard’s currency reform 
and elimination of price controls were instituted. Absenteeism plummeted as the price 
and rationing controls that had de-incentivized the stagnant workforce were eliminated, 
boosting workforce participation rates immediately (Henderson, 2018). Food shortages 
also ended; shops were immediately filled as owners began to understand the value of the 
new German currency. The German middle class began to rapidly grow as a result of the 
low tax rates and better jobs. In the 50s and 60s, unemployment was extremely low, the 
standard of living was high, educational opportunities were affordable and abundant, 
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West German industrial output continued to grow, and Western Europe became more and 
more economically cohesive, opening up opportunities for international trade and 
economic stimulation in strong economies. 
These initial economic growth and trade opportunities in the early 1950s were 
stimulated by Germany becoming further integrated with the rest of Western Europe. Due 
to economic reforms and the necessary of export markets to provide the demand needed 
to access its full productivity levels, Germany began to reenter export markets that it had 
not utilized in over a decade. West Germany developed important trade partnerships with 
other countries, most notably Austria, as the rest of Europe needed Germany’s newly 
accessed productivity and economic growth to recover themselves. West Germany had 
surpluses of food and goods that other European countries desperately needed, which 
only grew during the 50s as the economy became stronger and stronger. West Germany 
exported large amounts to assist European recovery in addition to making its reparations 
payments. In recognizing that peace was their best option, West Germany voluntarily 
entered into economic and political partnerships, providing increased stability and mutual 
economic stimulation. This is illustrated by the uniting of the European Steel and Coal 
communities in 1951, which laid the groundwork for the founding of the European Union 
in 1993. Six major European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands) agreed to run their heavy industries under a common management 
to assure that countries cannot make weapons to fight against other European nations, as 
was the case in the past (European Union, 2018). This united these six European 
countries economically and politically, setting common goals for economic success and 
lasting peace (European Union, 2018). West Germany also joined NATO in 1955, 
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cementing their long-term goals of peaceful relationships and interdependencies with the 
rest of Europe. In joining NATO, West Germany showed that it was more than willing to 
defend other member countries from unwelcome Soviet political advances, displaying its 
dedication to free-market capitalist economies and trade. Elimination of Nazi regulations 
and adopting pro-market reforms proved to be extremely profitable for West Germany 
and Europe as a whole. In contrast, the heavily regulated East German economy, plagued 
by Soviet communist controls and economically distant from most of the West, stagnated 
and ultimately failed. 
Another explanation of West Germany’s post-war economic growth can be found 
in productivity convergence. German productivity finally converged to British levels in 
1960 after trailing British GDP per man by at least 25% until 1950 (Ritschl & 
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 213). The lower output-per-worker ratio, explained by WWI, 
inflation, and the Great Depression, kept German GDP at relatively low levels until it was 
able to converge properly. This is also supported by Temin’s research in Western Europe 
economic growth after WWII, in which he found that “Movement from agriculture to 
industry the larger a country’s share of employment in agriculture – his proxy for delayed 
structural change – the faster its growth” (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193).  
The final reason for the strong levels of growth is the lack of strong industrial and 
financial restrictions of the Allied Powers in the years following WWII and the extended 
reparations payment plan, which extended to 2010, when the UK announced that 
Germany had made its final reparations payments. This allowed for mostly unhindered 
economic growth stimulated by Allied economic assistance. All these arguments, 
however, have some form of inherent validity, meaning that most likely the fairest 
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argument is that it was a combination of all these factors that allowed for the economic 
growth. 
Differences in the Approach of Foreign Powers 
There were large differences in the approach of foreign powers that assisted 
Germany in being so successful and economically independent. The first is that instead of 
loans, the vast majority of the Marshall Plan assistance came in the form of gifts. Just as 
America’s loans to Germany in the years preceding the Great Depression stimulated the 
German economy, the influx of strong foreign currency from the Marshall Plan and the 
rest of the Allied powers following WWII greatly assisted the German economy. 
However, the US government recognized that gifts would be far more valuable for all 
nations in the long run and that the recovery of Europe would be directly linked with the 
recovery of Germany. With gifts instead of loans, West Germany (along with the other 
recipients of Marshall Plan assistance) would be able to purchase foreign goods, 
stimulating jobs and production across Europe and the US. In doing so, nations would not 
suffer the large employment drop that characterized the years following World War I 
(Toussaint, 2006). 
The second difference was the implementation of a firm and viable plan for 
repayment and foreign control of monetary policy that would still allow for economic 
growth and employment. After WWI, Germany was beaten down with unrealistic 
reparations payments that, when coupled with the horrific internal fiscal decisions, ruined 
the economy. Understanding that supporting the German economy was the best decision 
for Europe resulted in helpful controls being placed and assistance being lent to the 
German people, including stimulating production of domestic industry in order to reduce 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 37 
its reliance on imports (Toussaint, 2006). Instead of just taking as much money as 
possible from Germany, Potsdam called for smaller payments over a large period of time 
which would stabilize the economy, leading to political stability as well. This would also 
allow for the recovery of foreign nations, as more money would be able to be taken from 
Germany over an extended period of time while not eliminating its purchasing and 
industrial power.  
Another difference was the uniting of Western Europe as a collective whole that 
had to recover rather than separating countries in terms of inherent wartime badness or 
goodness. In beating down the German economy through huge war reparations, it was 
unable to fully recover and as a result discontent and anger grew as Germany felt 
alienated and mistreated after WWI. The simplistic view of taking as much as possible 
from one country that had done wrong and giving as much as possible to the countries 
that were innocent had proved to be incredibly flawed. In contrast, Europe as a whole had 
to be united and lifted up in order to successfully recover (Toussaint, 2006). In linking 
the economies of all Western European countries through foreign aid and gifting them 
capital to purchase foreign goods, Western Europe was able to work together to 
experience a period of peace and growth together.  
WWII Conclusion and Summary 
After WWI, Germany’s people were starving, they were heavily reliant on foreign 
loans, their currency was worthless, and their government was extremely unstable, 
engineering a perfect climate for the rise of Adolf Hitler. In the late 1950s and 60s, 
however, West Germany had the strongest economy in Western Europe if not one of the 
strongest in the world. They had booming industry, strong currency, and were extremely 
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independent, limiting their reliance on imports and stimulating domestic production. If 
Germany’s post-WWI failures (notably hyperinflation and Hitler’s rise) are mainly 
attributed to internal decision making within the German government, it seems only fair 
that Germany be attributed with most of its post-WWII economic successes.  
The German economy succeeded for several key internal reasons. The first of 
these reasons was post-war productivity shock. After the war, Germany began to repair 
its infrastructure and regain access to its full productive and industrial capacity. German 
productive capacity was never truly eliminated during the war, and was still much higher 
than before the war started. The German government devoted large amounts of 
manpower and capital to its infrastructure, and it was quickly repaired (including the 
bottleneck sectors that the Allies had destroyed). As a result, employment and worker 
productivity rose, allowing Germany to regain its productive potential and transfer its 
large wartime economic potential to domestic industry.  
Germany was further able to become more efficient by moving from peasant 
agriculture to non-wartime industry and more efficient large-scale modern agriculture. As 
Germany was forced to provide food for its starving people and the large number of 
Allied soldiers occupying it while concurrently stimulating industry, it became more 
efficient with its agriculture while simultaneously moving much of its population to 
domestic industry.  
These changes were also supported by Erhard’s currency reforms and decontrol of 
prices, leading into the next reason for German economic growth and stimulation: 
institutional changes and monetary policy reforms. These reforms began with 
denazification, as the new German government and Allied powers sought to remove all 
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Nazi influence from all areas of the government. Ludwig Erhard, a staunch anti-Nazi 
Bavarian economist, was tasked with reforming monetary policy. This became 
manifested in radical changes, including complete currency reform and adoption of the 
deutschemark, decontrol of prices, removal of rationing, and the lowering of the high tax 
rates characteristic of large wartime expenditures. These pro-market reforms revitalized 
the economy, incentivizing sellers, lowering unemployment and absenteeism while 
simultaneously raising productivity, and ending food shortages. The economy quickly 
became highly stabilized, incentivized, and productive as Erhard’s free-market policies 
took the place of the Nazi controls. This is closely related to the productivity convergence 
highlighted earlier. Germany suffered from low levels of output-per-worker due to WWI, 
hyperinflation, and the Great Depression. This kept German GDP and low levels as it 
sought to fully fight off the adverse effects for decades. As noted earlier, the German 
GDP began to converge after WWII, partially due to the large movement from agriculture 
to industry and the increase of worker productivity and motivation due to monetary 
stability. 
The early German economy, and the later West German economy, was further 
stimulated and stabilized by its cohesion with the rest of Western Europe. In order to 
reach its immense productive capacity in the years following the war, it was forced to 
look for export markets that were willing to buy German goods in order to rebuild. The 
abundance of demand for German goods allowed it to increase production and lower 
unemployment in order create the supply needed to meet this demand as well as 
strengthen trade alliances. West Germany also entered peaceful alliances with foreign 
powers through NATO and the uniting of Europe’s steel and coal economies that 
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provided political stability, assisting West Germany in its goal of maintaining long-term 
peace and stabilizing its economy. 
This is not to say that West Germany did not receive substantial help from the 
Allied powers, especially the United States. The Allies did help a great deal; however, 
their most effective assistance came in the form of simply letting the German economy 
grow without major interference (with the exception of the Marshall Plan and 
government stabilization). The lack of unnecessary restrictions on the German economy 
allowed the economy to grow and prosper without the interference that plagued it during 
the years after WWI. The extended reparations payments and the way that they mirrored 
the health of the German economy helped stimulate growth and economic stability in 
order to utilize Germany’s productive and economic prowess to boost Europe as a whole. 
It also enabled Germany to pay its reparations payments over an extended period of time, 
providing the countries it had wronged with a steady stream of capital that could be used 
to rebuild. Another key form of assistance from the Allied powers in Germany came from 
the stabilization of the government and economy immediately after the war. This aid 
manifested itself in assistance with the election process, denazification of the 
government, stimulation of food production, military presence to maintain peace, and 
financial aid. This allowed Germany to recover quicker and more rapidly than would 
have been expected if it was operating on its own and successfully remove Hitler’s 
authoritarian influences on German institutions. The Marshall Plan also greatly assisted 
German rebuilding of infrastructure, especially the fact that almost all of the financial aid 
was in the form of gifts rather than loans. This meant that Allied assistance did not raise 
the amount of German debt and result in a situation similar to the US loans being recalled 
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when the Great Depression hit. In lifting up the German economy through the influx of 
strong foreign currency, all of Europe was able to experience Germany’s substantial 
economic contribution after the war. This (along with NATO) also brought Western 
Europe as a whole closer together, providing it with a common enemy: Communism. The 
treaties and conferences following the war as well as the Marshall Plan sought to unite 
Western Europe politically and economically in order to promote sustained and lasting 
peace. 
Despite these crucial external contributions, the unparalleled success of the West 
German economy can mostly be attributed to internal German policies, reforms, and 
productivity. As easy as it would be to attribute Wirtschaftswunder to the efforts of the 
Allied Powers, that simply would not be true. Although the programs and the changing of 
the approach as a whole of the Allied Powers assisted Germany, Germany itself was 
responsible for stabilization of their currency and raising their production levels and 
efficiency to match their pre-existing capacity after the war. Unlike after WWI, they did 
not allow themselves to be over dependent on the US and other world powers; instead, 
they implemented moderate protectionist policies regarding imports, pro-market reforms, 
and moved much of their workforce from agriculture to industry.  
Although several of Germany’s successful pro-market plans were at first 
suggested and implemented immediately after the war by the Allied powers to make sure 
Germany would not completely starve or develop war potential, it was free-market 
Germans such as Ludwig Erhard who adopted them and perfected them, coupling them 
with currency reform and complete restructuring of German financial institutions. Many 
changes were actually contrary to the initially Allied vision of German monetary policy, 
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such as the elimination of price controls and rationing in order to stimulate workforce 
participation and food production. Even the controls that were suggested by the Allied 
Powers were later completely entrusted to the German government to monitor after it was 
deemed strong and established. Besides balancing out the economy immediately after the 
war, ensuring that Germany could not develop a war potential (along with Marshall Plan 
aid obviously), and supervising reparations payments, the Allies were actually quite 
detached from the majority of West German economic controls as early as 1950.  
There was also never truly a point where the Allied Powers had the full control 
over the German finance departments and the German economy, and if there ever was, it 
was only immediately after the war and for an extremely short period of time. Instead, 
they worked in a supportive role to help strengthen the new anti-Nazi German 
government. Although the Allies maintained a strong military presence there to resist the 
Soviet-led expansion of communism, West Germany was declared to have the “full 
authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs” at the Convention on 
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, just 
10 years after their WWII surrender (Junker, 2011, p. 117). This is quite notable, 
especially when one considers the fact that Germany had singlehandedly started the two 
the largest wars in the modern era in a span of just 25 years and the Allied powers 
therefore were forced to take every possible precaution to make sure Germany would not 
have the opportunity to repeat its actions. The Marshall Plan, while assisting Germany, 
also cannot be entirely attributed with the German economic miracle, as many Americans 
have attempted to do. 
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Marshall Plan aid to West Germany was not that large. Cumulative aid 
from the Marshall Plan and other aid programs totaled only $2 billion 
through October 1954. Even in 1948 and 1949, when aid was at its peak, 
Marshall Plan aid was less than 5 percent of German national income. 
Other countries that received substantial Marshall Plan aid exhibited lower 
growth than Germany. Moreover, while West Germany was receiving aid, 
it was also making reparations and restitution payments well in excess of 
$1 billion. (Henderson, 2018). 
In fact, it was actually the lack of interference in the German economy that also assisted 
its growth and the growth of Europe as a whole, further supporting Adam Smith’s 
capitalistic ideas of the invisible hand and free market self-regulation.  
Final Conclusion 
As stated previously, the goal of humanity should be to promote peace and 
stability and make the recovery of devastated countries as easy as possible. Therefore, 
there is a duty for strong foreign powers after wars to help devastated countries recover 
and regain stability and health. A large part of this involves engineering climates that 
stimulate economic growth and stability to supply domestic jobs, providing food for 
citizens of that country, and providing opportunities to repair the infrastructure. This duty 
does not entail choosing which countries recover and which countries stay buried in 
economic hardships; rebuilding a continent devastated by war necessitates rebuilding the 
individual countries and economies within it and making sure they are stable upon 
leaving them. This is of the utmost importance because economic stability can directly be 
linked to political stability; in making comparisons to the US forces in the Middle East 
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during the Gulf and Iraq War, unrest has been prevalent in countries that the US 
interferes in then withdraws from because there is a lack of economic and political 
stability, leaving the door open for tyranny and authoritarian rule.  
There were opportunities to learn from their mistakes that proved to be extremely 
beneficial for both Germany and the Allied powers. Germany learned valuable lessons 
about restricting inflation and maintaining currency valuation through free market 
policies. It learned that in departing from what gave their currency value (in the case of 
WWI, it was the gold standard) they could not spend large amounts (especially with 
money it did not have and with an unmotivated workforce) without its currency losing its 
value. Erhard realized that in order for Germany to recover and be completely denazified, 
it would have to shed the Nazi price and rationing controls as well as the high tax rate 
that would keep businesses from being stimulated. A more reasonable tax rate would 
actually stimulate recover and allow for more money to be collected in the long-run as 
less businesses would default and go bankrupt. Germany also learned that overreliance on 
a single/few outside powers for economic stability and rebuilding had the potential to 
result in economic failure, especially during time of economic crises. In reducing its 
dependence on foreign loans from a single nation and imports and becoming more self-
sufficient, it would be responsible for its own success. In WWI, Germany was ruled by 
others, whether that be as a result of reparations payments or its unwise decision to take 
on large amounts of foreign debt. In the years following WWII, it made the decision to be 
self-ruled, reducing the variance and uncertainty that can arise when over-dependent on 
foreign currency or governments for assistance. Germany recognized that it still needed 
strong foreign currency to combat any possibility of inflation as well as access its full 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 45 
productive capacity. To replace overreliance on a single outside power to support these 
needs, such as loans from the US after WWI, it developed intricate economic 
interdependencies and trade partnerships with many other strong European countries as 
well as America and eliminated its isolationist trade policies that had existed for decades. 
It stimulated foreign trade and exports, bringing in strong foreign capital while 
simultaneously accessing demand to match its productive capacity and supply of goods. 
Although the Allies cannot be blamed for directly causing Germany’s economic 
failure and hyperinflation (these can solely be attributed to decisions made internally 
within German institutions), Germany would never have been able to truly be successful 
with the reparations payments and heavy economic interference. The lack of a strong and 
viable reparations payment plan brought a lack of clarity, bringing more economic 
instability as German businesses were unsure of how the reparations payments would 
affect the economy as a whole. When the reparations payments were announced, they 
were immediately deemed to be impossible to pay by experts, adding to the further 
instability and trust in the German economy. While hyperinflation began before the 
reparations payments and the reparations payments did not necessitate hyperinflation, it 
limited whatever possible options Germany did have, regardless of how minimal they 
were. In refusing to help Germany recover in order to bring both political and economic 
stability and realistic payment plans, the Allies in the German economy that ultimately 
led to severe unrest and the rise of Adolf Hitler. This lack of necessary aid in Germany’s 
recovery also further delayed the rest of Europe’s recovery because the Allies attempted 
to be selective in which countries it wanted to recover after WWI; they beat down 
Germany in attempts to get as much money as possible to give to the countries that it had 
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perceived to have been innocent. Western Europe was starved of Germany’s purchasing 
power and production of goods, and it later paid the price of the lack of stability when 
Hitler took power and Germany began WWII. 
The Allies changed their approach to post-war aid and European economic 
recovery. They learned that, in attempting to rebuild Europe, it could not be selective on 
the countries it wanted to recover and those it wanted to punish due to the strong 
interdependencies that exist between the various European economies. It realized that, by 
design, Europe was united in ways that far superseded political agendas or wartime 
alliances, and in recognizing this unity, it was evident that Europe as a whole would have 
to be stimulated and assisted in order to be most effective in its recovery from WWII. It 
also realized that in punishing a country through economic instability and hardships, it 
would therefore be engineering a climate perfect for political instability and other issues. 
Economic instability, especially when it can be attributed to a foreign nation and is 
perceived as unjust (whether or not it is truly a result of the foreign power), leads to 
discontentment, internal turmoil, frustration, anger, and desperation which become more 
and more difficult to control. In the interests of creating lasting peace, the Allies realized 
that supporting economic recovery would be directly linked to peace and stability. The 
Allies placed very moderate sanctions on the economy, as stated, to limit wartime 
potential and assist in financial decisions without interfering with economic growth. The 
reparations payments, never more than 5% of Germany’s export value, were designed to 
mirror the health of the German economy. The controls the Allies implemented when 
Germany was at its weakest were given to the German people as soon as possible to make 
sure it was clear that Germany would be responsible for its own success or failure. The 
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controls the Allies implemented when Germany was at its weakest were given to the 
German people as soon as possible to make sure it was clear that Germany would be 
responsible for its own success or failure. Supporting economic recovery and refraining 
from implementing unnecessary controls, convincing Germany that they would be 
responsible for their own success or failure, brought a complete change in the Zeitgeist, 
translated directly as the “spirit of the age” or “spirit of the time” The post WWII 
Zeitgeist was characterized by feelings of hope, stability, contentment, and security 
instead of the pre-WWI feelings of anger, frustration, humiliation, and hatred. It is these 
post-WWII dominant feelings such as these that helped bring long term peace to West 
Germany. The Allies also learned that its aid to Germany would be most profitable in the 
form of gifts, not loans. In restricting the amount of debt Germany was in and assisting in 
its recovery, the Allies were therefore able to take advantage of Germany’s purchasing of 
American goods and productivity, proving to be much more valuable in the long run than 
repayment of loans that would restrict growth and purchasing power. The Marshall Plan 
was a fantastic example of this; in providing no-strings-attached financial aid to 
countries, they were able to recover quicker, stimulating trade and productivity which 
America and the UK were therefore able to take advantage of. Although this was not the 
main cause of the success, it certainly assisted Germany’s economic growth. The Allies 
also realized that for a country to experience unhindered growth, it therefore must not be 
limited by unnecessary interference. In keeping reparations payments lower and 
extending the payment plan over a longer period of time, the German economy was able 
to grow and reach its untapped productivity levels. Also, in eliminating the tariffs on 
German goods that existed in the years following WWI as a way of punishing Germany 
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for its wrongdoings, the German economy was able to grow and develop important trade 
relationships that benefitted all of Western Europe as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 49 
References 
Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government (USSR, UK, and USA). (2008). 
The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945. Retrieved September 
13, 2018, from Yale Law School: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp 
Boemeke, M. F., Feldman, G. D., & Glaser, E. (1998). The Treaty of Versailles: A 
reassessment after 75 years. Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press. 
Brainard, L. (2007, June 4). The lessons of the Marshall Plan. Retrieved May 7, 2018, 
from Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-lessons-of-the-
marshall-plan/ 
Carlin, W. (1996). West German growth and institutions, 1945-90. In N. Crafts, & G. 
Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945. Cambridge University Press. 
Crafts, N., & Fearon, P. (2013). The Great Depression of the 1930's: Lessons for today. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
European Union. (2018). A peaceful Europe- the beginnings of cooperation. Retrieved 
September 20, 2018, from European Union: https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en 
European Union. (2018). History of the European Union. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from 
European Union: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en 
Graham, F. D. (1930). Exchange, prices, and production in hyper-inflation: Germany, 
1920-1923. New York: Russel & Russel. 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 50 
Henderson, D. R. (2018, February 5). German economic miracle. Retrieved December 
21, 2018, from The Library of Economics and Liberty: 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GermanEconomicMiracle.html 
Junker, D. (2011). The United States and Germany in the era of the Cold War, 1945-1968 
(Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Knapp, M., Stolper, W. F., & Hudson, M. (1981, September). Reconstruction and west-
integration: The impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics, 137(3), 415-433. 
Office of the Historian. (2017). Marshall Plan, 1948. Retrieved October 17, 2018, from 
Office of the Historian: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-
plan 
Office of the Historian. (2018). The Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, German reparations, 
and inter-allied war debts. Retrieved August 30, 2018, from Office of the 
Historian: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/dawes 
Ritschl, A., & Eichengreen, B. (2009, January 1). Understanding West German economic 
growth in the 1950s. Cliometrica, III(1), 191-219. 
Sennholz, H. F. (2006, October 27). Hyperinflation in Germany, 1914-1923. Retrieved 
May 18, 2018, from Mises Daily Articles: https://mises.org/library/hyperinflation-
germany-1914-1923 
The Wiener Library for the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide. (2018). The Weimer 
Republic. Retrieved July 7, 2018, from The Holocaust Explained: 
https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/the-nazi-rise-to-power/the-weimar-
republic/invasion-of-the-ruhr/ 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER 51 
Toussaint, E. (2006, October 24). The Marshall Plan and the debt agreement on German 
debt. Retrieved November 1, 2018, from Committee for the Abolition of 
Illegitimate Debt: http://www.cadtm.org/The-Marshall-Plan-and-the-Debt 
UNC Center for European Studies. (2018). The end of WWII and the division of Europe. 
Retrieved October 23, 2018, from Center for European Studies: A Jean Monnet 
Center of Excellence: https://europe.unc.edu/the-end-of-wwii-and-the-division-of-
europe/ 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. (2018). Treaty of Versailles. Retrieved June 
7, 2018, from Holocaust Encyclopedia: 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/treaty-of-versailles 
US War Department. (1957). WWI: Killed, wounded, and missing. Retrieved February 2, 
2018, from Encyclopedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/event/World-
War-I/Killed-wounded-and-missing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
